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Abstract  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has produced a health and economic crisis of unprecedented 
scope. As economists and policymakers turn to the task of recovery, protecting human rights 
remains intrinsically important, both morally and legally. It is also instrumental to the ends of 
public health and economic resilience. This Article argues that the human rights to life, health, 
education, social security, housing, food, water and sanitation – the so-called economic and social 
rights – are as essential as civil and political protections. Moreover, rather than simply ameliorate 
the inevitable indignities and material deprivations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
implementation of duties to respect economic and social rights can help ensure their protection in 
the post-COVID-19 economy. For this to occur, however, the Article suggests that the application 
of human rights to the economic recovery should be informed by a longer history of economic 
crises, assisted by both international and comparative economic and social rights frameworks, and 
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I. Introduction  
 
Human calamities threaten human rights. But they also force critical new understandings 
of their importance. The COVID-19 pandemic has produced a health and economic crisis of 
unprecedented worldwide scope. As economists and policymakers turn to the task of recovery, 
protecting the basic rights of everyone, anywhere in the world, has not only significant moral and 
legal importance. It also serves the ends of public health and economic resilience. Human rights 
to life, health, education, social security, housing, food, water and sanitation – the so-called 
economic and social rights – are as essential as civil and political protections.  
 
The application of these rights to this moment is critical, as the policies adopted during the 
economic recovery will recast both the present and the future. The economic recovery will affect, 
for example, the shape of technological innovation, the energy mix between renewables and fossil 
fuels, the design of food, sanitation, water, health care and education systems, the administration 
of social services, and the distribution of wealth.1 The choices that are demanded include which 
productive sectors to rescue, with what conditions attached, and how to distribute their costs, by 
taxes or deficits or debt relief, and with what forms of international cooperation.2 While other 
international principles, such as the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, 
offer importance guidance, the human rights framework establishes obligations that states must 
follow, if they are to accord due respect to people’s dignity, equality and freedom. Such 
obligations, sourced in international human rights conventions and other laws, do not set out a 
singular prescription to follow, but they create space for new claims, and oblige each state to 
explore options and alternatives, through a process which respects civil and political rights, and 
which ensures that baseline social, economic and cultural protections are met. 
 
Just as the human rights framework offers important principles and standards to guide the 
recovery, economic and social rights have also become a focal point for several national and 
transnational campaigns during the crisis. These campaigns have been bolstered by the fact that 
the rights they demand, would also, if realized, help limit the spread of disease and stabilize the 
economy from further shocks. A global call has been made been made for a “people’s vaccine” 
against COVID-19, shared between all countries, suggesting a coordinated response to the 
realization of rights to life and health.3 In the US, advocates have also called for novel precedents, 
for extending health insurance, waiving medical fees, and reducing medicine prices, both from the 
state and private actors.4 Similarly, advocates for the right to housing have demonstrated the ready 
availability of tools of implementation, through locating city space for shelter, rent forgiveness or 
mortgage repayment suspension, and a moratorium on eviction and foreclosures.5 Newly focused 
campaigns have been directed against water and electricity shutoffs, sanitation neglect, insufficient 
workplace protections for essential workers, and obstructions in access to food and education. 
Attention to cash transfers has increased, and once marginal proposals for the realization of 
economic and social rights, such as a universal basic income, appear more tenable.6 Related 
campaigns call for tax justice and debt reform, and to an end to the disproportionate racial and 
gender impacts, in both health risk and care responsibilities, of the pandemic.7 The Black Lives 
Matter racial justice movement has intensified within the US and emerged in protests elsewhere. 
These campaigns are often coordinated across countries, and increasingly literate about what they 
demand for economic justice and human rights.8 
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This renewed emphasis on economic and social rights pull in two directions. In one 
direction, targeted proposals are made to ameliorate the indignities and material deprivations of 
those burdened by the pandemic and sidelined in the rescue, stimulus or growth packages to come. 
In the other, more transformative agendas, with highly uncertain configurations, are presented in 
order to reorganize the central tenets of the global economy and their domestic counterparts. These 
tensions recall previous efforts to apply the idea of human rights to political economy. The most 
famous of these is Amartya Sen’s call for “development as freedom”, which helped introduce the 
Human Development Index over cruder state measures of aggregate growth and GDP, and sought 
to connect positive human functioning with human rights.9 But efforts to apply human rights to 
economic ideas and institutions stretch back to the birth of the contemporary human rights 
frameworks, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “UDHR”).  
 
This Article, which takes the form of a “think piece” for human rights-guided policy and 
law for the post-COVID-19 recovery, suggests that the application of human rights to the economic 
recovery should be informed by a longer history of economic crises, assisted by both international 
and comparative economic and social rights frameworks, and open to the institutional 
reimagination that the idea of human rights helps to generate. First, in Part II, it argues that the 
Great Depression, rather than the more recent Global Financial Crisis, offers a more instructive 
lesson for how the idea of human rights can accompany the reconstruction of the post-COVID 
economy. Secondly, in Part III, it examines how legal standards developed around the state 
obligation of “progressive realization” point to both ameliorative and more transformative 
implications. Thirdly, in Part IV, it examines what the recognition of economic and social rights 
in present-day constitutions, courts, and human rights campaigns suggests about economic rescue 
or reform. These different features – historical, doctrinal, and comparative – help to inform the 
idea of a human-rights based economic recovery.  
 
II. Situating the Crisis in Human Rights History 
 
Crises create immense pressure on the laws, policies and practices that protect human 
rights; they also catalyze changes in response. As of July 2020, COVID-19 has infected at least 13 
million people around the world, and led to at least 570,000 deaths.10 The shutdown of economic 
activity has taken its own egregious toll, setting measures of human development – longevity, 
access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living – backwards, with predictions that over half 
of the world’s population will be living in poverty in the aftermath of the pandemic, in the absence 
of dramatic and internationally coordinated intervention.11 In the face of such a crisis, the pressures 
to ameliorate the hardships are immense, just as are the demands to transform present laws and 
systems in more just, rights-protective, directions.12 Two previous economic crisis – the Great 
Depression of 1929-33 and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 – offer distinctive lessons about 
the nature of the human rights responses, particularly in the different emphases put on economic 
and social rights. 
 
Each crisis has its own causes and character, and there is of course much that is unique 
about the present moment. The extreme economic contraction caused by the arrival of COVID-19 
is a foreseeable result of a deliberate economic shutdown, prompted by the spread of a highly 
infectious and dangerous disease. At one point, more than half the world’s population stayed at 
home, by order, request, or permission of governments.13 While this vast restriction of movement 
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appears, prima facie, as an unprecedented limit to human freedom, it also represents an immense 
coordinated effort at protecting precisely that freedom, in terms of human rights to life and health. 
The scope of this economic contraction raises several questions – of how human rights may be 
limited during emergencies, and how civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights relate to 
each other during such periods, and how previous economic crises, including both rapid and 
“slower” economic crises, answer that question. While the economic crises analysed below were 
not prompted by health emergencies (the HIV/AIDS pandemic is instructive on that particular 
front14), they underline the task of economic recovery, and the social learning that took place, 
around human rights. 
 
1. The Global Financial Crises 
 
In 2008, the Global Financial Crisis was recognized as the worst economic crisis since the 
Great Depression. Spiraling from the US to the rest of the world, it came at the heels of global fuel 
and food crises which had seen spikes in food prices and widespread increases in hunger and 
poverty in the global South. Defaults on subprime mortgages and other financial derivatives 
produced a chain of collapses in important institutions, destabilizing whole countries and regions. 
The massive increase in poverty and inequality, within and between countries, arguably lay the 
foundations for the populist politics that followed, in turn presenting further threats to human 
rights.15 Both the crisis itself, and the “recovery” policies that were drawn up to ameliorate its 
effect, were responsible for profound regressions in economic and social rights protections. This 
period is therefore illustrative of how human rights became rapidly sidelined by the more 
influential prescriptions of neoclassical economics, that saw them as obstacles to economic 
recovery.  
 
The earliest response to the crisis was to ameliorate hardship, as we see now with the most 
immediate COVID-19 response;16 but these policies did not endure. The early fiscal stimulus 
packages and social protection interventions, which mitigated the early effects on the poor, were 
scaled back by most states in 2010, and austerity measures were adopted as their replacement.17 
These measures, with precursors in World Bank and IMF policies adopted for countries in Latin 
America and Africa after the 1980s debt crisis (with disastrous results), burdened the poorest.18 
Social protection systems were eroded, with disproportionate impacts on women, children, and 
persons with disabilities. Spending on public services was cut, including in education and health 
care. In Greece, for example, an agreement between the IMF, the European Commission and the 
European Central Bank, required that health spending be cut from 9.7 per cent to no more than 6 
per cent of GDP.19 Public sector employment was reduced, regressive taxation increased, and food 
subsidies were limited. At the same time, states endorsed generous corporate bailouts, and relied 
on the idea, sourced in neoliberal economics, that the gains in economic growth would trickle 
down to the poor.20 The effect of these developments were notable for the long-term public health 
of the population. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has pointed out that 
these disinvestments have exacerbated the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,21 expressly 
connecting the present health and economic crisis with the earlier financial one. 
 
Austerity policies were heavily protested by citizens and residents in many countries. 
Although protestors did not, in the main, frame their protests in human rights terms,22 many human 
rights experts warned of the problematic neglect that such policies would cause to economic and 
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social rights. The Chairperson of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights wrote 
a letter to all state parties, noting that austerity policies could lead to rights infringements, unless 
measures were adopted to minimize their impact on economically vulnerable people.23 Some 
austerity programs were challenged successfully in court, with constitutional courts in Europe 
ordering the return of pensions under theories of equality, property and the Sozialstaat,24 and courts 
in Latin America supporting a “vital minimum” against encroachment, as they had done in earlier 
economic contractions.25 In the US, the epicenter of the crisis, some sub-national (state) courts 
prevented legislative retrenchment in health care and public schooling provision, particularly for 
immigrants.26 At the global level, human rights commentators began to connect human rights 
obligations more explicitly to the central banks and the International Financial Institutions that 
were playing such a large role in the recovery.27 Later, the 2019 Guiding Principles of Human 
Rights Impact Assessments of Economic Reforms, adopted by the UN General Assembly, sought 
to move away from ameliorative, ex post analysis, by setting out a framework for orienting goals, 
sequencing reforms (with attention to the most vulnerable), and establishing benchmarks and 
indicators for post-reform monitoring.28 These aimed for more lasting changes, as well as more 
immediately ameliorative measures, with principles described in Part III below. 
 
2. The Great Depression 
 
The temporary, at-most ameliorative policies of the Global Financial Crisis can be 
contrasted with the far greater institutional reorientations that occurred after the Great Depression 
that followed the crash of the US Stock Exchange in October 1929. The lessons from that period 
are pertinent to the present moment, suggesting a greater ambition, and institutional focus, in the 
human rights approach to the recovery. It was the economic recession, as well as the rise of fascism 
in Europe and World War II, that contributed to the expansive articulation of human rights in the 
Universal Declaration of 1948. In that document, “freedom from want” joined freedoms of 
religion, belief, voting and speech: civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights were 
combined under the “common standard of achievement for all mankind”.29 The Universal 
Declaration’s enumerated rights included fair work, social security, and an adequate standard of 
living, and it called on all states and the organs of the international community to respect them. 
These commitments did not appear from nowhere. They were sourced in philosophical, religious 
and cultural ideas, and comparative-legal examples. Later, they were bolstered and updated by the 
decolonization and feminist movements they had originally sidelined.30 
 
These newly expressed commitments helped guide the economic reconstructions that 
followed World War II. They legitimated the expanding role of the state, and its administration of 
an increasingly complex economy. Indeed, the expressed commitment to a “freedom from fear and 
want”31 for all connected the earlier New Deal template of the US to the Bretton Woods 
Conference (at which the World Bank and the IMF were created). “Necessitous men are not free 
men”, had declared Franklin D. Roosevelt, but “are the stuff of which dictatorship is made”.32 As 
historian Elizabeth Borgwardt has emphasized, the template of relief and recovery, which had 
reshaped perceptions of “the capacity of the central government to tackle intractable problems with 
large scale institutional solutions”33 sought to foster a coordinated predictability in the 
international economic order. It echoed the New Deal perspective that “economic laws are not 
made by nature, they are made by human beings.”34 While the international financial institutions 
(and the US institutions of the New Deal) were later reshaped by the neoliberal economic 
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program,35 and were not free of profound human rights blindspots even in 1948, the transformative 
ambitions of the period are notable. Such lessons reinforce our understanding that there is nothing 
natural, or pre-destined, within the institutions of the current political economy. 
 
The changed emphasis on human rights that coincided with the deep-seated transformation 
of the pre-war laissez faire economies is therefore instructive. A recent surge of historical studies 
of this period have unsettled many of the assumptions about where human rights came from, and 
how they were understood. For example, the popular generational account of human rights (as 
emerging in three stages, first for civil and political rights, secondly for economic and social rights, 
and thirdly for cultural and environmental rights) has been disrupted, exposing longer historical 
trajectories and a more varied cross-cultural pedigree.36 The influence of self-determination and 
decolonization movements has also surfaced, which expose important links to land, and culture, 
in the formulation of such rights.37 These histories are important, as they allow for an exploration 
into very different institutional arrangements for securing economic and social rights, beyond the 
(important) welfare state models available. Thus, the history of human rights after the Great 
Depression is not here recounted in order to provide a model to imitate. Nor should it obscure the 
developments in human rights since (a particularly significant warning, as the Trump 
administration has sought to revisit human rights by sidelining developments beyond 1948).38 It 
recalls a global context for coordination which is not itself recoverable or desirable; and yet 
reminds us of what may be required of this one.  
 
Recalling the institutional ambition of the postwar moment reminds us of bigger 
opportunities for transformation, particularly as the contemporary toolkit of economic policies has 
evolved to better capture the goals of human rights realization within finite planetary resources.39 
The attempts to recast environmental sustainability, not as a byproduct of or afterthought to 
economic growth, but as precursor and precondition of it, orients the human rights challenge of 
the contemporary moment.40 It is the ambition and scope of the human rights approach that 
followed the Great Depression and World War II, rather than the more defensive approach that 
followed the Global Financial Crisis, that offers guidance for the present moment.  
 
3. Slower Economic Crises  
 
The immediate and global economic shocks produced by COVID-19 point almost 
intuitively to these former global crises, but is important to recall the myriad localized (or regional) 
and/or less rapid onset crises that have occurred since the adoption of the UDHR, and yet have 
done little to disturb the neglect of economic and social rights. Prominent histories of human rights 
have tended to spotlight the Cold War “split” of the UDHR between treaty regimes for protecting 
civil and political rights (the ICCPR) and for economic, social and cultural rights (the ICESCR), 
and the later, so-called “breakthrough” period of the 1970s.41 Both periods oversaw an intense 
marginalization of economic and social rights, and heralded the neoliberal reorganization of the 
global economy. That history is now well-known. The international financial institutions became 
increasingly directed towards an agenda of aggregate economic growth, rather than universal 
socio-economic guarantees; and the UN programs and special agencies, such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) ran independently from, rather than in sync with, the UN human 
rights regime (an orientation later reversed).42 Many human rights NGOs, headquartered within 
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the Global North, were galvanized by only one-half of the vision of human rights. States were 
often held accountable for only civil and political rights infringements, and indeed punished, in 
aid, trade and broader foreign policy, for supporting generous economic and social guarantees for 
their residents. The idea of human rights, particularly in US foreign policy (a prominent non-party 
to the ICESCR), became highly truncated and selective, ignoring the structural violence of 
protracted poverty and inequality.43 While actors within the UN human rights regime, and many 
NGOs of the Global South, continued to advocate for the more complete idea of human rights, 
particularly after 1990 and Cold War’s end, this advocacy took place in a period of overarching 
diminishment of economic and social rights. 
 
By the COVID-19 pandemic’s arrival, neoliberal reforms had reached every aspect of the 
global economy, exacerbating the disruptions occurring from technological change, increasing 
automation and the immense movement of people and capital.44 In the Global North, rising 
insecurity and diminishing services have been a notable feature of welfare states, and have been 
experienced by the poor, working class and middle class alike. As wages have stagnated and the 
cost of living – particularly housing – has risen, the economic and social rights first secured in the 
industrialized democracies have been withdrawn, as neoliberal policies have favored minimal 
regulation and provision, disinvestment in essential goods and services, such as health care and 
education, and regressivity in tax policy. In the Global South, where economies have been even 
more heavily exposed to investment, trade and development regimes, economic and social rights 
were early sacrificed to narrow conceptions of economic development. New forms of public 
provisioning were often extended on the basis of patronage, rather than rights. While the 
globalization of the economy helped lift many out of poverty (in China, for the most part, without 
recourse to human rights or even development goals), the benefits have been uneven as well as 
unreliable.  
Amidst these disruptions, the search for a sustainable pathway to economic development 
has been ongoing. In 2015, all UN members embraced 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
and formally supported a united focus on issues of water, energy, climate, oceans, urbanization, 
transport, science and technology. Yet the neoliberal prescriptions for economic development have 
complicated each goal: with growth achieved through foreign investment, private financing, the 
globalization of supply chains, resource extraction of minerals, fossil fuels, and agriculture, and 
an intellectual property regime which has restrained the use, exchange or sharing of essential seeds, 
medicines and knowledge more generally. Other components of the neoliberal agenda, particularly 
privatization and deregulation, have further limited the resources available to the state for the 
provision of essential goods and services, in such areas as health care, education, water and 
sanitation. The commodification of access to essential goods and services is the result, which, 
without extensive transfers, infringes economic and social rights. The outsourcing and transfer or 
wealth to private, often corporate, actors, have dovetailed with concerns about corruption and state 
capture.   
Despite this long period of diminishment, the UN human rights regime has continued to 
examine the effect of such policies on economic and social rights. The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which, by July 2020, had attracted 171 ratifications (roughly 
equivalent to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with 173),45 has been 
supplemented by other treaties, particularly for racial and ethnic groups, women, children, migrant 
workers, and people with disabilities46 and by the UN special mandates based heavily on their 
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protection. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights gained the authority to hear 
individual and inter-state complaints in 2013, with a mechanism that now has 24 State Parties.47 
Thus the diminishment of economic and social rights has not been met with silence within human 
rights campaigns. Indeed, an understanding of the links between all human rights has led to 
evolving demands for protection. The official UN doctrine of “indivisibility” has held, since the 
1968 Tehran World Conference on Human Rights, that economic, social, cultural, civil, and 
political rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, a doctrine reaffirmed in particular 
at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights.48 Social movements and other 
protagonists have forced a more express recognition of rights to access water and sanitation 
(proclaimed by a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2010),49 as well as land, and 
a healthy environment, which were incorporated into special mandates and treaty bodies’ work; 
additional movements have claimed clean air, electricity, public transportation, and essential 
communications infrastructure including access to the internet. A mobilized “right to 
development” was supplemented by a “human rights-based approach” (“HBA”) to development, 
providing an important, if narrow, lens in which to assess economic programs and initiatives.50 
Recent human rights declarations, for indigenous people and for peasants, have also reinforced a 
far broader range of human rights, and identified the grounds for more communal structures of 
protection.  
Indeed, during the same period of retrenchment, the recognition of economic and social 
rights found notable expression within the world’s constitutions. Many of these in fact predated 
(and informed) the UDHR of 1948, with constitutions protecting rights for workers, social security, 
education and health. These rights spread heavily during decolonization, and surged during the 
third wave of constitution-making from the 1990s. Quantitative studies indicate that rights to 
education, health, child protection and social security are now present in two-thirds of the world’s 
constitutions.51 The rights to housing, food and water, sanitation, development and land are 
relatively less prevalent, although the right to housing is gaining constitutional expression, 
alongside the right to a healthy environment. Labor rights have fared relatively less well – these 
are present in fewer than half of the world’s constitutions and are not trending upwards, with the 
exception of the right to join a trade union (which may also be conceived as a civil right). These 
rights are often expressly justiciable, meaning that their claims can be heard directly by a court, 
with implications detailed in Part III below. The United States constitution is a prominent outlier 
to these trends; nonetheless the same human rights exceptionalism does not apply to its state 
constitutions, historic entrenchers of rights for workers, education and environmental protection.52  
 
The economic recovery that will follow the COVID-19 pandemic will be layered onto this 
dual history – of a neoliberal decentering of economic and social rights in economic policymaking, 
and a re-centering attempt within fields of human rights and public law. This broad legal context 
will be relevant to the choices available for states in the post-COVID recovery, and a number of 
distinctive legal principles have developed in this period. It is to this framework that I now turn. 
 
III. The Contemporary Human Rights Framework  
 
Under the contemporary human rights framework, all states have obligations to respect, 
protect, and fulfil human rights, meaning that they must engage in both due restraint (negative 
obligations) as well as effectively regulate private actors, and provide goods and services (as 
examples of positive obligations). Relevant obligations are sourced in many parts of the UN human 
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rights treaties, as well as in a myriad of regional and national (including constitutional) 
formulations. Such rights may be limited, or derogated from, under certain restricted conditions, 
such as public health emergencies or severe fiscal strain. Thus, as with ethical theories of human 
rights, which emphasis their deontological significance, human rights protected within 
international law and in domestic legal systems must not be sacrificed to raw power, crude 
utilitarianism, or majoritarianism. Nonetheless, the interests that they protect may be subject to a 
disciplined trade-off in exceptional cases.  
 
While this Article is primarily addressed to the economic and social rights that are 
impacted, it is worth noting that according due respect to civil, political, and cultural rights will 
also be important to the post-COVID economic recovery, and continues as an integral part of the 
framework of indivisibility described above. For example, if rights of movement, assembly, 
voting, or a fair trial are limited (in order to prevent the spread of disease, for example) such limits 
must be necessary and proportionate, which require close scrutiny of their duration, location, scope 
and (non-discriminatory) impact.53 Some elements, of course, are non-derogable, even in states of 
emergency. It is worth noting that such considerations recall other historical crises in human rights 
history not mentioned in Part II above, such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, that go beyond the scope 
of the present Article. For economic and social rights, it follows that any limitations made of them 
must be justified as furthering public goals, decided openly and democratically, or that their 
progressive realization has been interrupted by a lack of available resources. These principles 
become particularly relevant in assessing the post-COVID economic recovery, and are described 
in this Part.  
 
1. Legal Standards for Economic and Social Rights  
 
Under the ICESCR (like the UDHR before it), state parties are required to “progressively 
realize”, according to “maximum available resources”, rights to an adequate standard of living, 
including education, health care, food, social security, and other essential goods and services for 
human dignity and survival.54 The obligation of progressive realization does not apply to civil and 
political rights, and has been derided by many skeptics as offering infinite flexibility.55 Such 
criticism does not stand up in practice. In the Committee’s hands, progressive realization presents 
a context-sensitive formula for differentiating the positive obligations – which are both of conduct 
and of result – between differently situated states. These are well adapted to help evaluate the 
economic recovery. Obligations of conduct attach, for example, to how states negotiate and plan 
the economic recovery, and requires that there be adequate processes for representation and 
participation, particularly for representatives of those whose lives will be most affected. 
Obligations of result focus on how the formulated policies themselves secure economic and social 
rights, again with attention to the most vulnerable. These broad obligations are long-standing, but 
it is worth detailing five additional legal standards which that Committee on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights have introduced since 1990, to provide further nuance to the obligation of 
“progressive realization”, and how it will apply to the economic recovery. 
 
First, the Committee introduced a baseline “minimum core” of “essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary healthcare, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of 
education”,56 that must be provided in all states, whatever their resources. This concept was to play 
a number of roles, and commentators still split on whether it presents a non-derogable obligation 
 11 
(which must be realized under any circumstances), or whether, as is more likely, it presents a 
prioritarian marker for the most urgent socioeconomic interests that demand immediate action. I 
am among the writers critical of the ambiguity of the “minimum core” concept, and for the 
problematic distinctions that are drawn between what is immediately obligatory for economic and 
social rights and what may be postponed. 57 Nonetheless, the Committee has delineated several 
substantive aspects of the minimum core, for the right to health, for example, or the right to social 
protection, that will no doubt be important guides during the economic recovery. For example, the 
Committee has suggested that, during severe economic contractions, each state must demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to draw on all available resources to secure such a minimum; and 
each state is obliged to identify, in its policies, the appropriate minimum as benchmark.58  
 
As the Committee sets out the parameters of “core obligations”, and states devise and 
publicize their minimum benchmarks for the health, housing, social security, food, water and 
sanitation they are in a position to secure, they goal of human dignity, rather than mere survival, 
is the more human rights-compatible focus. Both interpretations have been offered as orienting a 
“minimum core”, yet a focus merely on survival-based “basic needs”, while still influential in 
orienting certain development programs, discounts the humanist values of human rights. If 
accorded the broader approach, minimum thresholds, alongside social protection floors and other 
baselines,59 may play a more transformative, rights-protective role, beyond ameliorating the 
hardships experienced by the worst-off. This role may be especially apparent when the minimum 
core is used to inform broader participatory benchmarks of government, such as the requirement 
for reasonableness in state decision making, including in its budgeting decisions. For example, the 
recent jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights illustrates both 
the importance of the reasonableness standard for State’s choices in budgeting, and that such 
choices may be justiciable, i.e., subject to independent monitoring by human rights bodies.60 When 
supplemented by other principles of human rights, the minimum core may also help guide the 
duties of international assistance described below. 
 
A more modest threshold for the minimum core is problematic, especially given the 
growing economic inequality of recent decades. Samuel Moyn, for example, has suggested that a 
focus within human rights on status inequalities and a ‘sufficientist’ interpretation of economic 
and social rights has come at the expense of a robust challenge to economic inequality: that “floors” 
of minimal protection have distracted from “ceilings” against extreme wealth.61 While Moyn’s 
presentation of the broader idea of human rights may overlook some of the economic and social 
rights advocacy described during the periods of the UDHR enumeration and later, slower, crisis, 
particularly outside of the United States, this concern gains precision when it applies to the 
minimum core concept, and indeed reflects many of its earlier criticisms. As I observed a decade 
ago, the minimum core concept risks a “lowest common denominator” approach to economic and 
social rights, and may draw attention away from the States of the global North.62 Yet by following 
country-specific benchmarks, which are duly focused on human dignity, the concept may play a 
significant role beyond the most resource-pressured States. Indeed, the majority of the world’s 
poor people now reside in middle income states,63 and minimum benchmarks are often left 
unrealized in many high income, and highly unequal, countries. Under the post-COVID conditions 
of ever-escalating economic inequality, in between and within many countries, the concept of the 
“minimum core” may become more relevant. The effect of setting minimum thresholds is therefore 
 12 
not irrelevant to economic inequality: raising the standard of living of the poorest, or preventing 
intolerable regressions, are important safeguards against inequality.  
 
The second standard that is relevant is the presumption that the erosion or diminishment of 
previously secured economic and social rights is incompatible with progressive realization. States 
therefore have an affirmative obligation to justify any deliberately retrogressive measures as 
necessary and proportionate, according to the Committee.64 Retrogressive policies include 
unjustified reductions in expenditures for public services that have proved critical to economic and 
social rights, such as the austerity measures described in Part II above. States must then indicate 
that they considered alternative measures, but none were less restrictive to rights. This obligation 
adopts the methodology of proportionality, which is familiar in other human rights frameworks.65 
The Committee’s concession to temporary ‘backwards’ steps during financial and economic crises 
therefore accommodates the exigencies of such emergencies but requires their justification as 
necessary and proportionate. Critics have suggested, however, that a too-ready acceptance of 
justifications has diminished previous requirements of participation and review, and provided 
insufficient guidance on how such policies can be monitored, including their temporary nature and 
the determination of how the emergency situation comes to an end.66 
 
In the context of COVID-19, the presumption against retrogression represents an 
opportunity, and a danger, in the economic recovery. On the one hand, as the crisis management 
of the pandemic itself has produced hitherto unprecedented state provisioning and management of 
people’s access to health care, housing, education, and social protection, powerful calls will be 
made to maintain or extend such protections. These calls suggest an extended timeline, even 
permanence, for the most immediate measures of assistance. New campaigns have been made for 
governments to extend evictions moratorium, for example, or to turn rent suspension into 
cancellation, with powerful corollaries in the human right to housing. Other campaigns have 
sought to convert individual tax deferrals to tax relief for those with limited income; or to make 
the temporary social protection and cash transfers and help packages, particularly in low income 
countries, a more permanent feature of government practice.67 The immediate response to the 
pandemic has made previously unattainable levels of state assistance apparently in reach.  
 
On the other hand, the focus on retaining such pandemic-related high-points in state 
protection, which would take the form of appeals to the non-retrogression standard, may not 
always prove beneficial to rights advocates. Justifications of retrogression on grounds of 
proportionality tend to invite arguments about resource constraints when applied to economic and 
social rights, and force a “dollar versus rights” framing.68 Hence, states may point to the severe 
economic shocks of the pandemic to justify later cuts to state provisioning as necessary and 
proportionate. This may be particularly easy to justify by states when disease control is no longer 
an urgent aim, and that impetus for protection is removed. Cuts may also be easy to justify 
according to what are necessary and proportionate, when the extent of the resulting deficits to each 
state, caused by the massive spending and stimulus needed to stabilize the economy in 2020, is 
felt. Moreover, many of the high-points of state protection during the pandemic are themselves 
short-term and flawed: the homeless shelters in the US, for example, hastily organized through 
vacant hotels and city spaces, have often not realized the goals of dignity; similarly health 
protections and unemployment benefits have often taken the form of medical fee waivers or one-
time checks, with little thought in how to alter the structural conditions that lead to health 
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disparities or wage precarity in the first place. Arguments about non-retrogression should not be 
used to freeze such measures in place; just as they are also less helpful for those whose demands 
for economic and social rights have not chimed with public health goals. 
 
A third human rights standard central to the economic recovery is the prohibition on 
discrimination. Indeed, this prohibition often operates more like a rule than a standard: it is 
fundamental to all human rights treaties, and means that states have immediate obligations to avoid 
any discriminatory purpose in, or disproportionate impact of, law and policy on grounds of race, 
sex, gender, language, religion, sexual orientation, national or social origin, disability status, socio-
economic status, or other prohibited ground. If there is discrimination, it must be justified as 
necessary and proportionate. The relevance of this protection is heightened by the disproportionate 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic’s health and economic effects, on women, children, people 
with disabilities, people of color, and the poor. Women, for example, represent more than 70% of 
health and social sector workers employed to address the pandemic.69 They are also burdened more 
by economic crisis in general, because they are often overrepresented in the informal sector and in 
low paid or precarious jobs, and they are often the main recipients and users of social security 
protection and public services, which is linked to the burden of care work they perform in the 
family.70 Campaigns by racial justice movements reinforce the importance of greater participation 
and involvement in the formulation of the policies towards economic recovery, suggesting a 
vigorous role for non-discrimination.71  
 
While the economic recovery will undoubtedly produce winners and losers, the prohibition 
on discrimination compels a state response if the gaps in access to housing, education, food, water 
or other essential service are experienced along prohibited grounds. The substantive equality at the 
heart of this principle also requires that vulnerable and disadvantaged groups must be protected as 
a matter of priority. As a matter of human rights law, affirmative measures are not only permitted, 
but required,72 such as tax measures or social transfers. The particular vulnerability of the groups 
mentioned above, including women, children and immigrant groups, suggests that cuts to state 
services, such as in childcare, maternal health care, and domestic violence services, may 
themselves violate principles of non-discrimination.  
 
2. The Global Context of the Recovery 
 
The obligation on states to progressive realize economic and social rights is not limited to 
the national sphere, and is relevant to decisions made within the integrated global economy. Within 
the ICESCR, progressive realization must be committed to, by the state’s “maximum available 
resources”.73 Those monitoring international human rights law, such as UN special rapporteurs or 
treaty bodies, have given this aspect of states’ obligations discernable bite. Maximum resources 
are defined by a states’ ability to both mobilize and generate resources with sustainable 
parameters.74 For example, a State which has allocated a disproportionate amount of its budget to 
defense spending, while its public services are compromised, will stand afoul of the obligation.75 
So, too, will its potential tax resources be counted, even if under-utilized,76 so that policies to 
expand the tax base, combat tax evasion and tax progressively will be important to its available 
resources. Available resources are also defined with respect to “international assistance and 
cooperation”.77 In this respect, the emphasis on available resources focuses attention on how high-
income countries provide financial and other resources to poorer countries. As governments have 
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committed more than $11 trillion dollars to the crises (as of June 2020),78 conventional arguments 
about resource constraints have little purchase, and demands for international transfers find support 
in human rights law.  
 
The delineated framework of states’ extraterritorial obligations, which refer to acts and 
omissions of a government that affects the enjoyment of rights outside of a State’s own territory, 
are also critically important.79 Such obligations are relevant for the global economic recovery, as 
they may apply to states' duty to regulate private actors, including multinational corporations, as 
well as the responsibilities of states in their membership of international financial institutions, the 
sanctions policies adopted by states, and other forms of participation in international relations. For 
example, the IFIs have played a large role in the economic recovery, in making proposals of debt 
relief and significant recovery packages. At the same time, in continuing to promote structural 
adjustment, such proposals may have the effect of at-most ameliorative solutions, with limitations 
on economic and social rights. 80  
 
The obligations on multinational corporations are also relevant. The Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights have sought to delineate human rights responsibilities with more 
specificity, by outlining different pillars of responsibilities, including corporate responsibilities to 
respect rights, and states’ duties to protect them.81 The principles used to “embed” such 
commitments among business groups, although responsive to economic and social rights, rely on 
soft, voluntary commitments, many of which are weakened by international trade and investment 
law. While proposals for a treaty on business and human rights have long stalled,82 multilateral 
efforts may be given renewed emphasis during this period, and these soft principles may harden. 
At a minimum, current rescue packages and bailouts must be tied to conditions, such as respect for 
worker protections, or meeting climate change goals. In this respect, the formal state duty to protect 
economic and social rights by appropriate regulation of private actors will be bolstered by real 
bargaining power. 
 
3. New Approaches to Measurement and Accountability  
 
The obligations and legal standards described above are assisted by the significant advance 
in human rights methodologies in recent decades, even as they, at base, depend on open and public 
engagement for their overall effectiveness. A growth of measurement tools from the social 
sciences – indicators, benchmarks, rankings – have captured the information generated by 
multidimensional poverty and human development indexes to assess the compliance of particular 
states. Some measurement tools assess the “outcome” of rights fulfilment, such as how a state’s 
population fares according to benchmarks like literacy, infant mortality, life expectancy, and 
access to clean water, sanitation and power sources. Recent measures expressly contrast these 
outcomes with how many resources the state had to spend.83 Moreover, as the data on outcomes 
can be disaggregated along lines of gender, race, ethnicity, location, or socio-economic status, such 
information helps to detect, prima facie, the discriminatory impact of a state’s policies and laws 
on vulnerable groups. There are also snapshots provided by the social investment ratios generated 
by the UN Development Program; just as there are ratios for GDP and aid. Other accountability 
tools are concerned with broader measures, which help make them more attuned to the 
participation, accountability and transparency goals of human rights (some are designed to 
generate information only through participation).84 A forceful debate about the scientific 
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pretentions and lack of robustness of such tools has, predictably, taken place.85 Yet with a critical 
acknowledgment of methodologies and baselines, such tools can help supplement the information 
presented by those claiming rights in various locales.  
 
In recent years, a particular set of tools have been developed to address the challenges of 
economic recovery. The UN Guiding Principles for Human Rights Impact Assessments for 
Economic Reform Policies emerged from lessons learned of the Global Financial Crisis and sought 
to harness a unified assessment of policies in fiscal, monetary, tax, debt, trade, aid, and 
environmental programs. The goal behind their drafting was expressly not to develop new human 
rights standards, but to provide ‘effective and practical guidance and tools to different stakeholders 
for assessing economic reform policies on the basis of existing human rights standards.’86 The 
favored methodology is the human rights impact assessment, with is hoped to democratize 
resource mobilization and spending decisions, and prevent undue external influence on states 
receiving assistance or debt relief. This ex ante approach suggests that states should compare, in 
their assessments, different scenarios of economic recovery, including through budget cuts, tax 
increases or tax compliance strategies, and reviews of tax spending.87 Critics of the use of such 
impact assessments in the related field of foreign investment have emphasized that they work best 
in providing evidence for the likely effect of different approaches, rather than as the basis for one-
off remedial compensation for projects.88 These lessons will be relevant in the economic recovery 
itself, and, if such criticisms are observed, are likely to provide accountability for a more 
transformative, rather than merely ameliorative, approach.  
  
IV. Economic and Social Rights outside the UN Human Rights Regime   
 
As states enact laws and policies to address the economic recovery from COVID-19, it is 
not only the UN human rights regime that is relevant. Other arenas of human rights law and 
advocacy will play a part, including those that have emerged during the slower economic crises 
that have been taking place, particularly in the Global South. This Part turns to much fully explore 
the role of economic and social rights recognition, justiciability, and enforcement, at the national 
level. These developments repeat some of the ameliorative or more transformative tropes of human 
rights frameworks, inject both accountability, and fresh perspectives, into the idea of human rights 
in the post-COVID economic recovery.  
 
1. Constitutional Rights and Courts  
 
As constitutional reforms have swept the globe, and resulted in the formal attention to 
economic and social rights in the majority of the world’s constitutions (described in Part II above), 
connections have grown between human rights and constitutional rights.89 Constitutional reforms 
that are expressly protective of human rights, most prevalent in post-transition countries and 
regions such as in South Africa, Latin America, or Eastern Europe, are sometimes considered 
merely tokens or legalisms.90 One critical portrayal presents the enumeration of economic and 
social rights as a constitutional compromise between property-holding minorities and the 
majoritarian poor, with a knowing wink that “juristocracy” tends to defend the former.91 Yet courts 
have in fact defended and secured economic and social rights in important ways, both as baseline 
protections for health care, housing or social grants, for example, or as defenses to retrenchment. 
Outside of courts, national human rights commissions, Ombudspersons, legislative scrutiny 
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committees, human rights impact assessments and audits, and other public processes, have been 
formed, with mixed results but certainly new templates for budgetary and broader economic 
scrutiny.92  
 
The success in economic and social rights-based litigations varies by court, state, region, 
and time period; and even the measure of success, in material or symbolic terms, is controversial. 
Nonetheless certain courts, notably within Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Asia and South 
Africa, have offered innovations in both reviewing legislation and policy for economic and social 
rights infringements, and ordering remedies upon findings of their breach. Court involvement will 
raise the prospect of further state accountability of the decisions on which the post-COVID 19 
economic recovery will be based. The trend towards litigating rights is also significant for the legal 
principles that have been formulated, such as judicial review of the “reasonableness” of state action 
in this area, and the judicial orders of remedies that help prompt participation in enforcement. 93 
 
There is not a singular model of judicial review of economic and social rights. Perhaps the 
most prominent model is seen in South Africa, where the Constitution expressly recognizes 
economic and social rights. The South African Constitutional Court has delivered important orders 
against state encroachment (in arbitrary evictions, for example), state neglect (in failing to cater, 
in housing policy, for the vulnerable during crisis), state corruption (in respect with social grants 
payments contracts), discrimination (in depriving permanent residents of social grants) or 
unreasonableness (in preventing antiretrovirals in public hospitals, or in failing to attend to crisis 
conditions in housing policies).94 This body of caselaw has created accountability for state 
decision-making, including in setting budgets and in public procurement. It has also focused 
attention on how private individuals, such as owners of property, may have particular 
responsibilities to others. Other regions have developed their own models of judicial 
responsiveness. In Latin America, for example, courts have focused on both the rights of the most 
vulnerable as well the social state promise for all, delivering orders against “radical deprivation”.95 
Courts have also provided recourse for broader claimants around health care. The latter cases have 
generated equal parts criticism and endorsement: for the “middle-class bias” they expose, or for 
their long-term defense of universal protections.96 Within the US, the increasingly vibrant research 
field of law and political economy has set out an elaborate set of tools to explore how the judicial 
development of private rules of tort, contract and property, or the features of particular regulatory 
regimes, help to challenge economic inequality and precarity.97  
 
Judgments by courts in relation to economic and social rights do not have straightforward 
pro- or anti-democratic effects, as both critics and advocates attest. Some courts have introduced 
accountability on governments in their interactions with global economic actors, with benefits for 
both rights realization and broader democratic principles. In the Indian Supreme Court, the 
prominent “right to food” campaign was galvanized by court-appointed commissioners as well as 
popular protest, leading to interactive feedback from courts and civil society, and leading to new 
legislative changes around food security, with mixed results.98 These trends are not wholly distinct 
from global North counterparts, particularly in the cases decided in the aftermath the Global 
Financial Crisis, described in Part II above. Recent climate change litigation has followed this 
model as well.99 Other litigation, such as anti-TRIPS agitations around health care, or anti-IMF 
reforms, had similar transnational dimensions.100 Many with the greatest impact for rights have 
catalyzed political responsiveness elsewhere than before courts: channeling democratic 
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engagement between bureaucracies and social movements, for example, or Ministers and voter-
constituents, rather than ordering substantive, court-supervised, remedies. Such processes will 
create additional avenues of scrutiny for the decisions reached during the post-pandemic recovery.  
 
2. Participation in the Human Rights Project 
 
Laws and accountability frameworks can only do so much, by themselves. But the 
contribution of human rights to the economic recovery is much greater. The great asset of human 
rights, on many philosophical accounts, is the special access that their protection opens, to the 
intersecting dimensions of freedom and dignity in the human experience.101 This access comes, 
not only due to the mature framework of civil and political protections that have been established, 
and the recognition of rights’ indivisibility, but for the galvanizing and mobilizing, and 
information-generating potential of rights-talk itself. As the recovery affects an unfathomable 
degree of change in health, food, education, work, social security, water, and sanitation systems, 
it will be important to gather and include diverse voices and perspectives in the formulation of 
human rights and in the devised steps to realize them. These aspects of participation are likely to 
be become increasingly visible in the post-pandemic recovery, even as rights claimants may be 
disconnected from the technical experts who are charged with designing the response.  
 
In this respect, it is helpful to draw some short lessons from other “mergers” of human 
rights discourse with related regimes, such as development or water management, that were 
extended during the “slow” economic crises described in Part II above.102 The human rights based 
approach to development (RBA or HRBA), for example, became a prominent focal point of 
advocacy from the 1990s. The results included the human development index, described above, 
which sought to transform the metrics of state success beyond GDP. The merger also established 
bold institutional reforms for the development field, like requiring economic ministries, such as 
finance and planning, to integrate rights into the economic policy making process. When the 
“human right to water” was articulated, first as part of the right to an adequate standard of living 
under the ICESCR, and later as a human right to water and sanitation recognized by the General 
Assembly, the same questions were asked of what human rights added to a previously regulated 
area. 
 
The express connection of the human rights framework to these fields did not always 
operate as expected. For the human rights based approach to development, human rights 
organizations began to acquire a greater fluency in economic, social and cultural rights, and 
establish alliances with environment and development actors. Nonetheless, many expressed 
objections to the way the RBA failed to empower marginalized groups, or change power relations. 
Critics suggested that “rights based approaches” became too rapidly specialized, but that looser 
exercises in “rights talk” were a preferable alternative. This more open-ended – “tactically 
polyvalent”103 – exercise of “vernacularization” has long been promoted as a more culturally 
attuned, less top-down, appreciation of the human rights agenda.104 The method of “rights talk” 
may be open to newer articulations of human rights, and create more imaginative languages about 
new methods of creating access to essential resources or other proposals.105 For those assessing 
the increasing calls for the human right to water, and their response, the human rights discourse 
was cast, in its best light, as offering “a tool for constant and empirical critique with a search for 
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contextual solutions, rather than the basis for overarching political and policy program.”106 These 
lessons are salutary in the use of human rights in the post-COVID economic recovery.  
 
Of course, not all rights have the same mobilizing effect, just as the language of rights does 
not resonate in all cultural contexts. Human rights to health care, education, housing, food, water, 
are not mere mirrors of each other. In this respect, it is useful to move between both holistic and 
separable perspectives.107 These perspectives, which I detail in full elsewhere, indicate the strength 
of the overall human rights framework, alongside the benefits of more focused campaigns on the 
disaggregated interests that are formulated within it. In the first, holistic perspective, economic 
and social rights operate together to realize the values of dignity, equality and freedom; as 
indivisible as the broader range of rights, the infringement of one is likely to compound the other, 
and the effects of stratification or commodification or financialization, for example, are often 
comparable for each.108 In the second, rights demarcate interests that are connected with different 
regimes of law, and their realization is assisted by different forms of scientific or professional 
expertise. Some may be constitutionally protected, and some may not. They may have different 
legacies of public provision, and draw out different connections within civil society, whose 
members may enjoy different levels of social and cultural capital in formulating claims. The 
insights gained by holistic and separable perspectives are distinct: it is important, in considering 
the human rights-impact of the COVID-19 recovery, to engage both perspectives to explore how 
the realization of each right impacts others, but may raise distinguishable problems and solutions. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
This Article has explored the idea of a human-rights based economic recovery after 
COVID-19. In calls to #build back better, references to human rights are now made in advocacy, 
policy circles and partisan political campaigns. This Article suggests such references to human 
rights should undergird a renewed commitment to the human rights to life, health, education, social 
security, housing, food, water and sanitation – the so-called economic and social rights – although 
civil, political and cultural rights are necessarily connected to that approach. It also suggests that 
a human rights approach does not offer a singular, uniform policy prescription. Instead, it offers 
the parameters of accountability and participation that have been a known feature (or at least goal) 
of the UN human rights regime since the UDHR. Taking the form of a “think piece”, this Article 
combined historical, doctrinal, and comparative analyses to examine how human rights can inform, 
and alter, the course of the coming economic recovery. 
 
It is impossible to predict the deep swathes of transformations that will occur before the 
pandemic ends. Without a vaccination or new therapies, economic activity will continue to be 
deliberately restricted in order to limit contagion; many of the typical assumptions for economic 
recovery – such as stimulating consumption after a decline in aggregate demand – will not feasible 
until the necessary human interactions can take place safely. As COVID-19 continues to unfold, 
many conventional economic and cultural ideas will be recast. This uncertainly scrambles neat 
distinctions between ameliorative and more transformative approaches. Nonetheless, it is possible 
to track the tension between those that seek to immediate alleviate hardship, and those that seek to 
alter the laws and policies that create exposures to that hardship, within the modern-day human 
rights framework. First, turning to history, the Article showed that the Great Depression became 
part of an ambitious global prompt for both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 
 19 
recognition of economic and social rights within that document. The Global Financial Crisis, on 
the other hand, was an at-best ameliorative exercise of immediate support, followed by a lengthy 
process of austerity that retrogressed important economic and social rights. Secondly, turning to 
doctrine, the Article mapped opportunities and tensions within prominent legal concepts of the 
minimum core, the presumption against retrogression, the prohibition of discrimination, and other 
standards which guide states’ obligations to progressive realize economic and social rights. It also 
describes the accountability techniques that seek to prompt both ameliorative, as well as more 
transformative, levers for reform, including the most recent approach to human rights impact 
assessment, and new social science strategies to disaggregate data on who benefits, and who loses, 
in the post-pandemic recovery. Finally, the Article conducted a broader sweep of human rights 
approaches outside of the UN treaty regime, including rights-protecting constitutions, courts, and 
national human rights institutions and other institutions, that may hold recovery strategies to 
account, and the call to mobilize greater participation, and claiming, by individuals and civil 
society. It is in these latter arenas that the more transformative ambitions of human rights will be 
won, or lost. 
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